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Note
Discovery of the Nontestifying Expert Witness'
Identity Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: You Can't Tell the Players
Without a Program
In the course of litigation, an attorney generally will find it neces-
sary to employ various experts in preparation for his case. By virtue of
their position, these experts are privy to many sensitive details concern-
ing the lawsuit. Counsel, however, may decide not to use the expert at
trial for any number of reasons: demeanor or appearance of the expert;
the expert's hostility to the client's position; or the existence of less ex-
pensive assistance. Nonetheless, the information acquired or opinions
formed by a nontestifying expert are protected from discovery under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(B), unless opposing counsel
makes a special showing of need.'
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, are silent regarding
whether and when discovery of a nontestifying expert's identity is permis-
sible. Consequently, the federal courts have developed conflicting stan-
dards for determining when a nontestifying expert's identity can be
discovered. Neither of these standards provides adequate protection for
counsel, the experts, or, ultimately, the parties.
Nonretaining counsel may want to discover the identity of a nontes-
tifying expert witness for several reasons. Nontestifying expert witnesses
may know facts or hold opinions essential to the nonretaining counsel's
case or his ability to satisfy the requisite showing of need under Rule
26(b)(4)(B). In addition, because ex parte communications with an ad-
verse expert witness can result in disqualification of counsel, regardless of
whether such communications were motivated innocently, 2 it is essential
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B). For the text of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(4), which covers discovery of testifying and nontestifying experts, see infra note 48.
2. Motions to disqualify opposing counsel are becoming favored weapons in the arsenals
of parties engaged in complex litigation. One author contends that a motion to disqualify is
almost certain to be made in a case with multiple parties and issues, in that the possibility of
conflict of interest is very great. See Note, The Appealability of Orders Denying Motions for
Disqualification of Counsel in the Federal Court, 45 U. CHI. L. RPv. 450, 450 (1979). The
complications that result from the current ambiguities involved in expert discovery are proving
to be one means by which parties may seek the disqualification of opposing counsel. See infra
notes 65-80.
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that opposing counsel know the identity of all nontestifying experts. A
recent case, 3 in which a nontestifying expert was dissatisfied with his em-
ployer and sought the greener pastures offered by opposing counsel, illus-
trates the dangers that opposing counsel can face when she is ignorant of
the identity of the other side's experts. In that case, the retaining party
obtained the disqualification of opposing counsel on the ground that op-
posing counsel had ex parte communications with an adverse, nontestify-
ing expert. This result could have been avoided if the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure required stronger judicial control over the process of ex-
pert discovery.
This Note discusses when a nontestifying expert's identity can be
discovered under Rule 26(b)(4)(B). It first traces the historical develop-
ment of expert discovery in federal court and chronicles the criticism
leveled at that development. Next, it demonstrates the harmful ramifica-
tions of Rule 26(b)(4)'s ("Rule") silence with respect to discovery of non-
testifying experts' identities through a short hypothetical. The Note then
discusses the conflicting approaches developed by federal courts in an
attempt to resolve the uncertainty surrounding discovery of a nontestify-
ing expert's identity. The Note concludes by proposing an amendment to
the Rule, which would increase judicial control over the expert discovery
process, and thereby alleviate the problems caused by its silence.
History Leading Up to Adoption of Rule 26(b)(4)
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure originally were adopted
in 1938, no rule expressly pertained to expert discovery. It is not clear
whether this omission was intentional, or whether the Advisory Commit-
tee intended other rules to cover the problems posed by expert discov-
ery.4 Regardless of intention, by the late 1950's, the lack of guidelines for
discovery of experts had created a chaotic situation: some courts allowed
discovery of an opponent's expert without qualification,5 while others al-
3. American Protection Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas, Inc., No. 83-2674,
slip op. at 5173 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 1984).
4. See Momand v. Paramount Pictures Distrib. Co., 6 F.R.D. 222, 229 (1938).
5. Especially in complex cases, some courts had begun to realize that allowing expert
discovery rendered substantial benefits, such as improving trial preparation, narrowing issues,
and eliminating surprise. Indeed, an entire case often revolved around testimony and facts
that experts provided at trial. It became imperative, therefore, that both sides of the issues
have access to vital facts. See United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968) (access to
expert appraiser's estimates of property value in condemnation action vital to fair adjudication
of the suit); United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593 (D. Md. 1963) (owners of
condemned land entitled to access to government expert's method of appraisal and facts con-
sidered by expert in determining land value); United States v. Nysco Lab, Inc., 26 F.R.D. 159
(E.D.N.Y. 1960) (action under the Food and Drug Act to halt the interstate sale of mislabelled
drug).
Other courts began to allow discovery of expert fact and opinion regardless of the case's
complexity, arguing that such discovery was required in all cases in order to prepare fully for
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together barred discovery of the expert.6
Those courts allowing discovery of experts concluded that there was
no legitimate reason to prevent the opposition from learning through dis-
covery what it would ultimately learn at trial and allowed discovery of
expert information on that basis. 7 In short, their view was that discovery
trial and to encourage settlement. See Franks v. National Dairy Corp., 41 F.R.D. 234 (W.D.
Tex. 1976); Knighton v. Villian & Fassio e Compagnia Internazionale, 39 F.R.D. 11 (D. Md.
1965) (personal injury); Henlopen Hotel Corp. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 33 F.R.D. 306 (D. Del. 1963)
(storm damage to beach front property).
6. See American Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Petroleum Prods. Co., 23 F.R.D. 680 (D.R.I.
1959); Boynton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1941); Lewis v.
United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Pa. 1940); McCarthy v. Palmer, 29 F.
Supp. 585 (E.D.N.Y. 1939), afl'd, 113 F.2d 721 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 680 (1940); see
also infra text accompanying notes 11-47 (extended discussion of courts' motives in denying
expert discovery).
Perhaps most indicative of the problems in expert discovery at this time was a series of
cases arising out of a patent infringement action, which was pending in the Eastern District of
Tennessee in 1946. The defendant in this action sought to depose plaintiff's experts from Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology and from Case Institute of Technology in Ohio. Plaintiff's
counsel, however, advised his experts not to answer any questions regarding information per-
taining to the plaintiff's case. The federal district court in Massachusetts found that the defend-
ant had no right to discover the expert from M.I.T. and denied the defendant's motion to
compel. Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 7 F.RD. 684, 687 (D. Mass.
1947). See generally 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTIcE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2029 (1970). The district court in Ohio, however, reached exactly the opposite result and
granted the defendant's motion to compel discovery of the expert from Case. Cold Metal
Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 7 F.R.D. 425, 428 (N.D. Ohio 1947), affid sub nom.
Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948); see 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra, § 2029. The Case expert, still refusing to answer in spite of the court's ruling, was held
in contempt. The contempt citation was upheld by the Sixth Circuit. Sachs, 167 F.2d at 570;
see 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, § 2029.
Inconsistent rulings with respect to expert discovery disrupted the entire discovery sys-
tem. Therefore, in 1946, the Advisory Committee proposed an amendment to the Rules that
would have banned all pretrial discovery of expert fact and opinion. See Report of Proposed
Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 5 F.R.D. 433, 456-70 (1946). This proposed amend-
ment would have banned only the deposition of the opponent's trial expert, and would have
apparently allowed other types of discovery, such as interrogatories. The Advisory Committee
Note to this Rule observed that "[parties who have retained expert witnesses at their own
expense are also protected, except as provided in Rule 35." Id. at 460. This is probably a
reference to the then newly developed work product doctrine, which was created in Hickman
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, § 2021, at 220 n.72;
Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Part One, An Analytical Study, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 895, 899 n.21 (1976). Application of the
work product doctrine to expert discovery was soundly rejected by the commentators, courts,
and the Advisory Committee itself in 1970. See infra text accompanying notes 25-35. Based
possibly on the inclusion of work product within the expert rule, however, Congress saw fit not
to adopt this proposition, and the circuit courts continued to allow or deny discovery as they
had before.
7. See, eg., Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948); Cold Metal
Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 7 F.R.D. 684 (D. Mass. 1947); Bergstrom Paper Co. v.
Continental Ins. Co., 7 F.R.D. 548 (E.D. Wis. 1947); Long, Discovery and Experts Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 38 F.R.D. 111, 118 n.52 (1965).
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simply advanced the time of disclosure. 8 Moreover, these courts believed
that the potential unfairness to the retaining party simply did not over-
come the opposition's need to discover the adverse expert's information. 9
Courts adhering to this view normally allowed discovery of the expert's
facts and opinions without any showing of extraordinary need. 10
Courts that placed an outright ban on expert discovery did so on the
basis of one of three theories: the attorney-client privilege,1 1 the work
product doctrine, 12 or the so-called "unfairness" doctrine. I3 In Cold
Metal Process v. Aluminum Co. of America,1 4 the Massachusetts district
court found that the expert was an agent of plaintiff's attorney and,
therefore, was covered by the blanket of attorney-client privilege.15 The
court reasoned that the assistance of these experts was indispensable to
the attorney's work, and that the communications of the client were
often necessarily committed to the experts by the attorney or by the cli-
ent himself.' 6 Because the expert acted as the attorney's agent and was
privy to exchanges of confidential information between client and coun-
sel, the court extended the attorney-client privilege to include the work
of the expert.
This analysis was soundly rejected by one commentator.1 7 The
commentator characterized the expert as the attorney's employee rather
8. Long, supra note 7, at 118.
9. Id. at 118-19.
10. Other courts, however, prohibited discovery of the expert's opinion, allowing only
discovery of the factual bases for that opinion. Long, supra note 7, at 118; see, e.g., United
States v. 284,392 Square Feet of Floor Space, 203 F. Supp. 75 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); United States
v. 19.897 Acres, 27 F.R.D. 420 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D.
376 (D.N.J. 1954); see also Graham, supra note 6, at 900. This distinction grew out of the
recognition that an expert's finding of fact constituted information necessary for the adjudica-
tion of the case and out of a generalized notion that both the expert and the retaining party had
a "property" interest in the expert's opinion, which could not be violated without just compen-
sation. See Walsh, 15 F.R.D. 376.
11. See, e.g., Carpenter-Trant Drilling Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp., 23 F.R.D. 257
(D. Neb. 1959); Colden v. R.J. Schofield Motors Co., 14 F.R.D. 521 (N.D. Ohio 1952); Schuy-
ler v. United Air Lines, 10 F.R.D. 111 (M.D. Pa. 1950); Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 7 F.R.D. 684 (D. Mass. 1947).
12. See Graham, supra note 6, at 900.
13. See Maginnis v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 207 F. Supp 739 (E.D. La. 1962); Hickey
v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 88 (E.D. Pa. 1952); Boynton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F.
Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1941); Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D.
Pa. 1940).
14. 7 F.R.D. 684 (D. Mass. 1947).
15. Id. at 686. The court held that "it [was] well established that such agents as an
attorney uses in his office in the preparation of cases, such as clerks and stenographers, may
not be compelled to testify as to interoffice activities or communications because they are cov-
ered by the privilege rule." Id.
16. Id. (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2301 (3d ed. 1940)).
17. Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L.
REV. 455, 458 (1962).
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than as the attorney's or client's agent."' Because the identities of the
employees of a party were discoverable,19 this commentator asserted that
extending the attorney-client privilege to cover expert information would
create a new, unnecessary discovery exception.20 Furthermore, he ar-
gued that the scope of the attorney-client privilege included only actual
communications between the attorney and client.21 The privilege never
had shielded the knowledge of the client, because a party then could
shield from discovery vital facts in a case simply by repeating them to his
lawyer.22 Because the client's knowledge was not protected then, by vir-
tue of basic agency rules, the knowledge of the expert must also remain
unprotected. 23 As experts often contribute vital information to a case, "a
party ought not to be permitted to thwart effective cross-examination of
[such] a material witness ...merely by invoking the attorney-client
privilege to prohibit pretrial discovery." 24
Some courts limited expert discovery on the basis of the work prod-
uct doctrine recognized in Hickman v. Taylor.25 In Carpenter-Trant
18. Professor Friedenthal noted, however, that an expert can be an agent if he occupies a
"managerial position" in relation to either the attorney or client. Id. at 457. An expert occu-
pying a "managerial position" would have the power to engage legal counsel for the principal,
or to make statements by which the principal would be bound. See Stewart Equip. Co. v.
Gallo, 32 N.J. Super. 15, 107 A.2d 527 (1954) (vice-president and sales manager of corporation
justified in refusing to answer questions on attorney-client privilege grounds); see also Parker v.
Carroll, 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 698 (Callaghan) (D.D.C. 1974) (lawyer/doctor who had examined
plaintiff prior to becoming his attorney justified in refusing to answer questions, as the lawyer/
doctor rendered legal advice, not medical, at the consultation).
19. See Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. v. Lumbermen Mut. Casualty Co., 60 F.R.D. 205
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
20. Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 460. Professor Friedenthal recognized that sensitive
information, such as trial strategy, would often be implicit in an expert's report. In his opin-
ion, however, this hardly justified an absolute ban because the retaining party could always
move for a protective order if the need arose. Id. Moreover, Friedenthal contended that ex-
pert reports need not be protected under the attorney-client privilege, for if the reports were
completed in anticipation of litigation, they would "ordinarily be privileged without need for
any special justification." Id. (footnote omitted). This apparent reference to the work product
doctrine of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), is entirely inconsistent with Friedenthal's
rejection of that doctrine as a separate basis for expert privilege.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id at 464; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 275 (1957) (knowledge of the
agent is knowledge of the principal). Friedenthal recognized that expert reports are communi-
cations, just like a letter from client to counsel, and deserve the same degree of protection.
Observations and conclusions, however, constitute evidence, which cannot be shielded by the
attorney-client privilege. Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 469.
24. Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 464.
25. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). This case arose out of the sinking of the tug, "J. M. Taylor," on
February 7, 1943, during which five crewmen, including plaintiffs decedent, were drowned.
Defendant's counsel interviewed the four surviving crewmen shortly thereafter, and obtained
their signed statements recounting the details of the accident.
After filing suit, plaintiff sought to discover statements of the tug's crew members taken
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Drilling Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp.,26 for example, the district
court relied on Hickman2 7 in holding that the work product privilege
covered expert reports prepared in anticipation of trial. The court rea-
soned that expert reports clearly were the results of an attorney's "pro-
fessional activities," and, therefore, should be protected from discovery.2 8
by defendant in connection with the sinking. The defendants refused to produce the state-
ments, arguing that they were privileged under the attorney-client doctrine.
The district court refused to recognize the witness' statements as privileged, and held that
discovery should be granted unless such discovery would impede the case's prosecution. Hick-
man v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479, 482-83 (E.D. Pa. 1945). When the defendant's counsel still
refused to produce the statements, the court held the attorney in contempt. Hickman v. Tay-
lor, 153 F.2d 212, 214 (3d Cir. 1945) (en banc).
The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, unanimously held that the production order was im-
proper and reversed the contempt citation. The court found that the work product of an
attorney, included all witnesses' statements taken in connection with a client's case. Id. at 222-
23. The court concluded that these statements were absolutely immune from discovery and
could never be taken from the opposing counsel, thereby creating an extremely broad privilege.
Id.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the finding of the Third Circuit, but in doing so,
struck a balance between the holdings of the circuit and district courts. Although the Court
found that the statements could not be shielded under the attorney-client privilege, the Court
held that discovery was nonetheless improper because the opposition in this case was merely
trying to forge its way into the defendant's trial strategy. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 455,
510 (1947). The Court softened this barrier to discovery by holding that witness statements
and other work product of an attorney, which could be hidden in an attorney's files in certain
cases in which the original witnesses were no longer available or reached only with difficulty,
was held to be discoverable only upon a showing of "necessity or justification." Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) codified the Supreme Court's holding in Hick-
man. In pertinent part, the Rule provides:
a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discovera-
ble under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or
for trial by or for another party by or for that other party's representative. . . only
upon a showing of that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the mater-
ials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering dis-
covery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall
protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(c).
26. 23 F.R.D. 257 (D. Neb. 1959).
27. Hickman left open the question of whether the work product immunity extended to
statements and other material obtained by counsel, or whether it also gave protection to inves-
tigators and experts whose reports would ultimately be used by counsel. C. WRIGHT, THE
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 554 (4th ed. 1983). Although lower courts were divided on the
scope of Hickman, see 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 2024, at 201 n.28, 205 n.37,
Rule 26(b)(3) apparently resolved the question in favor of protecting expert reports. C.
WRIGHT, supra, at 555; see also Almguer v. Chicago R.I. & Pac. R.R., 55 F.R.D. 147 (D. Neb.
1972); Bunting v. Gainsville Mach. Co., 53 F.R.D. 594 (D. Del. 1971); United States v. Mary-
land Shipbldg. & Drydock Co., 51 F.R.D. 159 (D. Md. 1970); Dingier v. Halcyon Lijn N.V.,
50-F.R.D. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
28. Carpenter-Trant Drilling, 23 F.R.D. at 261.
[V/ol. 37
The court stated that the "same protection accorded to lawyers' other
work as necessary to 'prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy
without undue and needless interference' must be accorded to his
technical information and strategy in the use of experts." ' 29 Thus, the
court concluded that expert reports were discoverable only upon a show-
ing of good cause as required by Hickman.
30
It was argued that this rationale should not be extended to protect
an expert's observations or opinions because the work product doctrine
shielded only the statements of witnesses, not their observations. 31 In
other words, while the work product doctrine protects a witness' written
statement to an attorney from discovery, it does not prevent the opposing
attorney from interviewing the witness in order to obtain the facts under-
lying his statement. 32 Therefore, in this view, even if the work product
doctrine shields an expert's report from opposing counsel, it should not
shield the expert's fact findings and opinions. 33 "The opinions and con-
clusions of an expert are not those which Hickman sought to protect...
[because they] constitute evidence in themselves, and may be the only
way in which to establish facts material to the case."' 34 Furthermore,
shielding an expert's observations and opinions from discovery might
prevent full disclosure of facts material to the adjudication of the
controversy.
35
29. Id. (quoting Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511) (citation omitted).
30. Carpenter-Trant Drilling, 23 F.D.R at 261. For other cases holding that expert re-
ports are covered by the work product doctrine to limit discovery, see Snyder v. United States,
20 F.R.D. 7 (E.D.N.Y. 1956); Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D.
Ohio 1953); Colden v. R.J. Schofield Motors, 14 F.R.D. 521 (N.D. Ohio 1952); Schuyler v.
United Air Lines, 10 F.R.D. 111 (M.D. Pa. 1950); Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co.
of Am., 7 F.R.D. 684 (D. Mass. 1947).
31. Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 470-73.
32. Id. at 470.
33. Id. at 472-73.
34. Id. (footnotes omitted).
35. Another commentator at that time, Jeremiah M. Long, however, recognized that the
expert could perform functions that were directly related to trial preparation, and that work
product ought to shield the expert from discovery of these matters. Because an "expert,
although usually a witness during a trial, often performs functions before trial in assisting
counsel to prepare direct and cross examination," he should not be available for discovery on
those matters which will not be offered as evidence at trial. Long, supra note 7, at 142; see also
Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. Haberman Mfg. Co., 87 F. 563, 565 (2d Cir. 1898) (Concern-
ing an expert, the court noted that "he has been retained by plaintiffs as an expert to assist
them in the presentation of their case. As such the witness would seem to come within the
privilege. . . as similar to that of counsel. More careful reflection has still further confirmed
the impression that assume the role of a witness."). Long accurately described the problem
that led to the adoption of §§ 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) and 26(b)(4)(B), which both seek to limit discov-
ery of expert information not to be offered at trial. See infra text accompanying notes 52-64.
Nonetheless, Long saw the possibility that an expert would function in this advisory capacity
as slight, and that the work product doctrine should not afford experts protection from discov-
ery when their work was related to the facts of the case. Long, supra note 7, at 142.
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The unfairness doctrine, which was based on two rationales, was
used by some courts to justify denial of discovery of experts. 36 The first
rationale posited that opinions and facts held by an expert constituted
"property" of both the expert and the retaining party and, therefore,
were not discoverable by opposing counsel. In Lewis v. United Air Lines
Transport Corp. ,37 for example, a third party sought discovery of an ex-
pert hired by United to perform tests on an allegedly defective aircraft
engine. The court denied the defendant's motion to compel discovery.
"To permit a party by deposition to examine an expert of the opposite
party before trial, to whom the latter has obligated himself to pay a con-
siderable sum of money," reasoned the court, "would be equivalent to
taking another's property without making any compensation therefor. ' ' 38
A substantial minority of courts adopted this argument and refused to
allow discovery of the expert when either the expert or the retaining
party claimed a property interest in the expert's knowledge.
39
It was argued that, by placing a premium on the expert's "prop-
erty," this rationale elevates form over substance, and thereby hinders
access to valuable information at the expense of a loosely defined inter-
est.4° Furthermore, discriminating in favor of one witness at the expense
of broader disclosure of relevant facts simply was not warranted in view
of justice's penchant for speedy, equitable resolution of disputes.
41
36. See Graham, supra note 6, at 901-02; Note, A Proposed Amendment to Rule
26(b)(4)(B): The Expert Twice Retained, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 533, 537 (1979).
37. 32 F. Supp. 21 (D. Pa. 1940).
38. Id. at 23. The court did note, however, that when the expert had made changes in the
engine, he should be required to state what those changes were. Similarly, if he performed any
tests on the engine that could not be repeated because of his examination, the court indicated
that it would require him to divulge the results of these tests. Id. The court's stance is entirely
consistent with the "exceptional circumstances" requirement adopted by the Advisory Com-
mittee when promulgating Rule 26(b)(4)(B). See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
39. See, e.g., Maginnis v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 207 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. La. 1962);
Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D.N.J. 1954); United States v. Certain Parcels
of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Hickey v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 88 (E.D. Pa.
1952); Boynton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1941).
40. Long, supra note 7, at 133.
41. Id. Indeed, Long argued that, as far as the possible monetary loss to the expert is
concerned, no special compensation was required because ordinary witnesses are routinely
obliged to travel considerable distances and to take time off from work in order to testify.
Experts, by virtue only of their advanced training, should receive no greater consideration than
any other witness. Id. In addition, Long indicated that even the courts that recognized the
"property" argument also realized that experts' conclusions and underlying facts were subject
to discovery in cases of extreme need. Long, supra note 7, at 134; see Walsh v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376, 378-79 (D.N.J. 1954). This tendency, even among courts that
favored more restrictive measures, indicated that
the rules are a product of the view that the public interest in justice is paramount to
considerations of fairness to attorneys, witnesses, or parties. Evidence, therefore,
cannot be withheld, nor does a property right exist in evidence, whether expert or
not, which supercedes the interests of the court in using it in ascertaining the truth
[V/ol. 37
The power of the court to order parties seeking discovery to pay
experts a reasonable fee for their services 42 also undercut the validity of
the property interest theory. If the court ordered compensation, the ex-
pert could not claim that he was robbed of his product, and the retaining
party could not claim that it had provided the opposition with free infor-
mation. Instead of recognizing the great benefits to be derived from ex-
pert discovery and the court's inherent power to mold the judical process
to limit inequities, the property interest theory focused on the possible
harm to the retaining party. Critics of this doctrine stated that rather
than ban expert discovery, courts generally should have allowed this dis-
covery, limiting the process as necessary to avoid harm.43
It also was argued in general that mutual pretrial discovery of ex-
perts and their conclusions is essential for effective cross-examination at
trial. One commentator asserted that "[u]nlike two eyewitnesses who
disagree, two experts who disagree are not necessarily basing their testi-
mony on their views of the same objective features. Instead they may
rely on entirely separate data, since the theoretical bases underlying their
respective approaches may differ radically." 44 If an attorney does not
have a fair idea of the basis upon which the expert's opinion rests, he
cannot, this commentator argued, cross-examine effectively.45 Especially
in technical cases, it is too late to develop effective cross-examination at
trial because such examination often relies heavily on advice and tests
from one's own expert. Hence, the benefits to justice that accrue because
of pretrial expert discovery outweigh potential unfairness.
The second rationale of the unfairness doctrine propounded the
view that expert discovery would allow one side to take advantage of the
work done by opposing counsel and would encourage the discovering
party to refrain from retaining his own experts.46 This rationale, how-
... .Discovery of expert information takes away no property right without com-
pensation, for the right to order discovery is reciprocal and the court has the power
to order compensation.
Long, supra note 7, at 135.
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii); see infra notes 51-61.
43. Long, supra note 7, at 135.
44. Fridenthal, supra note 17, at 485; see McGlothin, Some Practical Problems in Proof of
Economic, Scientific, and Technical Facts, 23 F.R.D. 467, 478 (1958).
45. Just as the attorney interviewing a witness to an automobile accident will want to
know the witness' exact location, what he was doing at the time of the accident, and anything
else relevant to the witness' perspective in order to prepare an effective trial examination of
that witness, an attorney faced with the prospect of examining an adverse expert at trial will
want to know of any tests that were run and other related information in order to attack the
sufficiency and outcome of the examinations.
46. In Schuyler v. United Air Lines Inc., 10 F.R.D. 111 (M.D. Pa. 1950), for example,
the plaintiff sought to discover United's expert who had prepared reports in anticipation of
litigation. United resisted discovery, arguing that allowing the opposition access to its experts
was unfair, in light of the fact that the plaintiff was fully capable of employing its own witness.
The court agreed with this argument, noting that allowing discovery would tend to encourage
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ever, ignored the courts' broad powers to condition discovery, and to
postpone discovery until both parties had retained their own experts. 47
Rule 26(b)(4)
In the wake of the criticism leveled at the prevailing judicial treat-
ment of expert discovery, the Advisory Committee proposed the Rule.48
The Rule divides experts that have been consulted in anticipation of liti-
gation into two categories. Experts that are expected to testify at trial are
governed by section 26(b)(4)(A). 49 The information these experts pos-
sess, along with the theories that they will present at trial, can be discov-
ered through interrogatories. The identity of these experts is also freely
discoverable. Experts that are not expected to be called at trial are gov-
erned by section 26(b)(4)(B) of the Rule.50 The information in their pos-
session, including facts, observations, and theories, cannot be discovered,
parties to jockey for position, with each waiting for the other to begin trial preparation. Id. at
114. This, the court held, would lead to unfortunate delay in bringing the case to trial, and
would severely prejudice the party that was diligent enough to have begun trial preparation far
in advance.
47. Long, supra note 7, at 124-28.
48. The Rule, as adopted, provides in pertinent part:
26(b)(4) Trial Preparation: experts.
Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts, otherwise discoverable under
the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and acquired or developed in anticipa-
tion of litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as follows:
(A)(i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify
each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state
the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the sub-
stance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a sum-
mary of the grounds for each opinion. (ii) Upon motion, the court may order further
discovery by other means, subject to such restrictions as to scope and such provi-
sions, pursuant to subdivision (b)(4)(C) of this rule, concerning fees and expenses as
the court may deem appropriate.
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has
been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or
preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as
provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which
it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the
same subject by other means.
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, (i) the court shall require that the
party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding
to discovery under subdivisions (b)(4)(A)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this rule; and (ii) with
respect to discovery obtained under subdivision (b)(4)(A)(i) of this rule the court
may require, and with respect to discovery obtained under subdivision (b)(4)(B) of
this rule the court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other party a
fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in ob-
taining facts and opinions from the expert.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
49. Id.
50. Id.
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except on a showing of "exceptional circumstances." The identity of
these experts, in contrast to the testifying expert, it not freely discovera-
ble. The Rule itself makes no comment on the discovery of the
26(b)(4)(B) expert's identity, but the Advisory Committee's Note indi-
cates that such information may be had upon the "proper showing."
The following hypothetical situation illustrates how the Rule func-
tions.51 Suppose that Lawyer P, during intermission at the opera, dis-
cusses with his companion, Doctor I, a difficult case that Lawyer P has
recently accepted. The lawyer's client has sustained a severe spinal cord
injury during the course of an operation, which was apparently necessary
to remove a life-threatening tumor entwined about his spinal column.
Doctor I initially indicates that he feels the surgeon who performed the
operation was not negligent. As a general thorasic surgeon, however,
Doctor I does not consider himself an expert in this field, and suggests
that the lawyer contact a colleague, Doctor N, a neurosurgeon.
Lawyer P contacts Doctor N, and arranges an examination of the
plaintiff. After the exam, Doctor N prepares a report for the lawyer,
which also indicates a finding of no negligence. Doctor N, however,
states in the report that he would have consulted with an oncologist
before attempting such risky surgery, and refers Lawyer P to a medical
school professor who is highly skilled in cancers of nerve tissues, Doctor
E.
51. Hypotheticals such as this one have been used often by authors to explain the func-
tioning of the Rule and to highlight their proposed solutions to the problems created by the
Rule's ambiguity. See Note, Discovery of the Nonwitness Expert Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(4)(B), 67 IowA L. Rlv. 349, 358 (1982); Note, supra note 36, at 533-34.
The author of the latter Note above assails the Rule for its inability to control the use of
experts in multi-party litigation. Stated simply, in multi-party cases, usually mass torts, the
necessity of showing exceptional circumstances to discover a nontestifying expert as required
by Rule 26(b)(4)(B) can be circumvented if one of a class of plaintiffs either drops out of the
litigation or settles his case. Because that plaintiff is no longer a party to the suit, the prohibi-
tions of 26(b)(4)(B) no longer apply to any experts he has employed. Because that one plain-
tiff's case probably will be substantially similar to others in a mass tort action, defense counsel
will have great interest in discovering these "recycled" experts. The author of the Michigan
Note contends that the restrictions of 26(b)(4)(B) should be applicable to experts, even if their
employers have dropped out of the lawsuit. Note, supra note 36, at 550. The present discus-
sion relates to a much broader problem with the Rule; namely, the discovery of the identity of
nontestifying experts. This question has much larger ramifications, for identity discovery
reaches the entire spectrum of expert usage and is not merely confined to multi-party situa-
tions.
The solution proposed in this Note, however, is also a sufficient remedy for the multi-
party "free agent" expert problem. By forcing all parties to disclose to one another and to the
court whether experts have been retained, the court can more easily ascertain which experts a
party may or may not discover. See infra text accompanying notes 138-45. With the identities
of all the experts disclosed, a party would be able to move for protective orders to prevent
discovery of a particular expert if substantial prejudice would result. Therefore, requiring dis-
closure of the identities of all the experts and allowing motions for protective orders also func-
tions to relieve the prejudicial effects of the multi-party free agent scenario.
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Doctor E examines the plaintiff and prepares a report. Doctor E's
report clearly states that any neurosurgeon should have consulted with
an oncologist before performing this surgery, and that the defendant was
negligent in not having done so.
With this information, the lawyer files suit against the defendant,
Doctor D, alleging negligence in not meeting the general standard of care
required for a physician of her training. As the case proceeds through
discovery, the defendant's lawyer seeks to depose any expert whom Law-
yer P intends to call at trial and seeks to discover the names, addresses,
and qualifications of all parties whom Lawyer P has contacted in relation
to the suit.
Lawyer P directs Doctor E, who will testify at trial, not to appear at
any depositions unless subpoenaed, and in that case, not to answer any
questions relating to information gathered or conclusions formed for this
litigation. Lawyer P also refuses to disclose to the defense the identities
of the other experts consulted in the course of his investigation. The
defense moves to compel, which forces the court to make an exhaustive
ruling on the scope of the Rule.
Initially, the court should deny the defense's request to depose the
testifying expert. Under the Rule, two levels of discovery are available.
The first, governed by subsection 26(b)(4)(A)(i), allows the opposition to
discover only through interrogatories the testifying, adverse expert wit-
ness' identity, the subject matter on which he will testify, and his opin-
ions.52 This limitation attempts to strike a balance between the
competing interests in the adversarial trial system by preventing the ex-
posure of the witness to an exhaustive deposition unless circumstances
warrant it, while still allowing the opposition access to material necessary
for the preparation of cross-examination. 53 Further discovery of the ad-
verse expert witness beyond the interrogatory stage is permitted at the
court's discretion. 54 Completion of the interrogatory phase, however, is
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i); see 4 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GROTHEER,
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.66[3] (1984); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6,
§ 2030; Graham, supra note 6, at 922-23.
53. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note.
54. Id. Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii); see 4 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GROTHEER, supra note 52,
26.66[3]; 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 2031; Graham, supra note 6, at 922-23.
It is not exactly clear what the discovering party must show before further discovery is permit-
ted, and unfortunately the Advisory Committee Note is silent on the topic. Some courts have
filled this gap by requiring a showing of substantial need before authorizing a deposition or an
exchange of reports. See Breedlove v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 57 F.R.D. 202, 205 (N.D. Miss.
1972) (reports of experts in product liability action not discoverable because plaintiffs failed to
show "unique or exceptional circumstances"); United States v. 145.31 Acres, 54 F.R.D. 359
(M.D. Pa. 1972) (defendants in condemnation case not entitled to production of expert ap-
praiser's report because need for discovery was not compelling), aff'd merr, 485 F.2d 682 (3d
Cir. 1973); Wilson v. Resnick, 51 F.R.D. 510 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (discovery of report itself avail-
able only upon showing of substantial need). These cases deal with requests for discovery of
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a prerequisite for discovery through depositions or access to reports.
5
The limitation in subsection 26(b)(4)(A)(i), however, extends only to
facts and opinions "acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or
for trial."'5 6 Thus, defendant's attorney may depose freely Doctor E re-
garding his qualifications, opinions, and testimony regarding other cases,
and any other relevant material that was not developed specifically for
the hypothetical case.5
7
The hypothetical defense interrogatory that seeks to discover the
identity of all persons contacted in relation to this suit poses equally diffi-
cult problems because this request would require disclosure of the iden-
expert documents and analyze the request under the "substantial need" test of the work prod-
uct doctrine in Rule 26(b)(3). See supra note 25 & accompanying text. Courts that allow more
liberal discovery do so on the theory that the Rule was promulgated to allow broader access to
the adverse expert. See Herbst v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 65 F.R.D. 528, 530-51 (D.
Conn. 1975) (There is no reason to treat an expert differently than any other witness under
26(b)(4)(A).); United States v. John R. Piquette Corp., 52 F.R.D. 370, 371 (E.D. Mich. 1971)
(The Rule creates liberal standards for expert discovery.). Two courts have held that an expert
report is not subject to the substantial need requirement of Rule 26(b)(3) because such reports
are governed by 26(b)(4), which stands apart from the work product rule and is subject only to
the general relevance requirement of 26(b)(1). See In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Anti-
trust Litig., 77 F.R.D. 39 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., 74 F.R.D. 594
(D. Conn. 1977); see also Hoover v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 611 F.2d 1132, 1142
(5th Cir. 1980).
55. See In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 77 F.R.D. 39,41 (N.D. Cal.
1977); United States v. IBM Corp., 72 F.R.D. 78, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). In addition, under
26(b)(4)(C), the discovering party will be required to defray part of the cost of any report he
discovers and the entire cost of any deposition he demands.
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i).
57. See id Rule 26(b)(4) advisory committee note; 4 J. MooRE, J. LucAs & G. GRO-
THEER, supra note 52, % 26.66[2]; 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 2029. The
requirement that an expert be "specially employed" for the purposes of litigation, and that his
information and opinions must be prepared "in anticipation of litigation or for trial," seems to
be a precaution against a party's hiding material facts from discovery by naming a material
fact witness and expert. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note.
Applying this portion of the rule has been difficult in cases in which the expert is an
employee of the party resisting discovery. A bit of detached reflection yields the obvious re-
sult: the employee is a regular facts witness until the point at which he was "specially retained"
for litigation, and, thereafter, an expert subject to the limitations set forth in the Rule. See
Congrove v. St. Louis S.F. Ry., 77 F.R.D. 503 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (expert doctor viewed the
accident that gave rise to the cause of action, so his knowledge of those facts freely discovera-
ble because it could not have been prepared in anticipation of litigation); Inspiration Consol.
Copper Corp. v. Lumbermen Mut. Casualty Co., 60 F.R.D. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (While an
insurance company could discover fully an accountant's statement of loss incurred from eleva-
tor collapse because the report was prepared in the ordinary course of business, it could not
discover documents that the accountant had prepared for settlement negotiations.); In re
Brown Co. See. Litig., 54 F.R.D. 384 (E.D. La. 1972) (in securities fraud action, employees of
a firm hired to express its opinion on the fairness of a proxy solicitation and consequent merger
discoverable as to those opinions, but not as to opinions prepared for trial); Duke Gardens
Found., Inc., v. Universal Restoration, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (expert hired
prior to instigation of suit freely discoverable).
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tity of the nontestifying expert, Doctor N, and of the nontestifying
informally consulted expert, Doctor . Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) states that
certain expert information is discoverable only if such information is de-
veloped in anticipation of litigation. 58 Courts have interpreted this limi-
tation as prohibiting discovery of experts who are only "informally
consulted." 59 Such experts, not having been consulted in anticipation of
litigation, simply do not fall within the requirements of the Rule.
Neither the Rule nor the Advisory Committee's Note, however, give any
indication of what must be shown to indicate that the expert was only
informally consulted. 6° Hence, it is unclear whether Lawyer P must dis-
close the name of Doctor I, whom he consulted at the opera.
Likewise, the Rule does not expressly prohibit the discovery of the
identity of a nontestifying, formally-retained expert; rather, the Rule pro-
tects only information and conclusions of the nontestifying expert.61 In
fact, the Advisory Committee's Note indicates that discovery of the non-
testifying expert's identity is available upon a proper showing. 62 This
"proper showing" clause has provided a rich field for the cultivation of
58. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)A)(i).
59. 4 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GROTHEER, supra note 52, 26.66[4]; see, e.g., United
States Marine Corp. v. American Aerosols, Inc., 631 F.2d 420, 423-25 (6th Cir. 1980); Ager v.
Jane C. Stormont Hosp. & Training School for Nurses, 622 F.2d 496, 501 (10th Cir. 1980);
Roesberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Tahoe Ins. Co. v. Morrison
Knudsen Co., 84 F.R.D. 362, 363 (D. Idaho 1979); Arco Pipeline Co. v. S/S Trade Star, 81
F.R.D. 416, 417 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Weiner v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 624, 628
(S.D. Fla. 1977); Baki v. B.F. Diamond Const. Co., 71 F.R.D. 179, 182 (D. Md. 1976); Ne-
metz v. Aye, 63 F.R.D. 66 (W.D. Pa. 1974); see also In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 83
F.R.D. 256, 259 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (Experts informally consulted did not have to answer
interrogatory absent showing of exceptional circumstances.).
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note; F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 6.11 (2d ed. 1977); 4 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GROTHEER, supra note 52,
26.66[4]; 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 2033; Graham, supra note 6, at 938-40.
61. 4 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GROTHEER, supra note 52, 26.66[4]; 8 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 2032; Graham, supra note 6, at 932-33. The opposition can dis-
cover the nontestifying expert witness' opinions only after showing that "exceptional circum-
stances" exist that necessitate the discovery. FED. P. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B). The Advisory
Committee and the courts indicate that the information to be discovered must be vital to the
resolution of the dispute, and that the party seeking discovery must be unable to obtain the
information elsewhere. See id. advisory committee note. In Pearl Brewing Co. v. Joseph
Schlitz Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Tex. 1976), defendants in an antitrust action
sought to discover the opinions of various experts who had created a computer model of the
Texas beer market at plaintiff's request in anticipation of this litigation. Although these ex-
perts were not slated to testify at trial, the court held that exceptional circumstances existed for
their discovery because plaintiff's trial expert, an economist, would rely heavily on the com-
puter model at trial, and defendants had no way of fully comprehending that testimony with-
out discovering the model's creators. Id. at 1138. The court, however, denied defendant's
request to discover the expert's alternative and prototype models because the defense had
failed to show the need for this discovery.
62. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(B) advisory committee note.
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various interpretations by courts63 and commentators.64 The issue of the
discoverability of a nontestifying expert's identity might not seem an ex-
tremely weighty one at first glance, but the problems that have grown out
of this issue have had disastrous consequences for counsel and the parties
to litigation. The dangers posed to counsel and client by the Rule's cur-
rent ambiguity are illustrated forcefully by a recent case from the federal
district court in Nevada. In that case, a rather unscrupulous expert tired
of his then present employ and sought the opposition's counsel in order
to strike a better deal for himself. The opposing counsel, unfortunately,
was not aware at first that the person he was dealing with was actually
his opponent's 26(b)(4)(B) witness. If he had known this, counsel could
have spared himself and his client the time and trouble caused by his
ultimate disqualification.
The MGM Case
In American Protection Insurance Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las
Vegas, Inc.,65 the plaintiff ("AMPICO") brought an insurance fraud ac-
tion against the hotel-casino ("MGM"). The plaintiff alleged that MGM
fraudulently had overstated its losses resulting from a 1981 fire in order
to defray the cost of a new addition to the hotel.
66
Problems arose during the discovery phase of the lawsuit. One of
MGM's vice-presidents, George Morris, was primarily responsible for
the details surrounding the reconstruction of the hotel and of the new
addition. After the hotel reopened, Morris and MGM's chief executive
officer prepared MGM's response to AMPICO's conflicting view of the
cost of reconstruction. 67 After AMPICO instituted its suit, Morris re-
63. The courts are divided evenly between those that hold that "proper showing" refers
to the "exceptional circumstances" test stated in Rule 54(b)(4)(B), see, eg., Ager v. Jane C.
Stormont Hosp. & Training School for Nurses, 622 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1980); In re Sinking of
Barge Ranger I, 92 F.R.D. 486 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Perry v. W.S. Darley & Co., 54 F.R.D. 278
(E.D. Wis. 1971), and those that hold that "proper showing" refers only to the relevance
requirement for all discovery in Rule 26(b)(1). See, e.g., In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig.,
83 F.R.D. 256 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Bald v. B.F. Diamond Const. Co., 71 F.R.D. 179 (D. Md.
1976); Sea Colony, Inc., v. Continental Ins. Co., 63 F.R.D. 113 (D. Del. 1974).
64. Compare Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: Part Two, An Empirical Study and a Proposal, 77 U. ILL. L.F. 169, 201 and
Annot., 33 A.L.R. FED. 403, 465 (1977) with 4 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GROTHEER, supra
note 52, 26.66[4] and 8 C. WRIGIT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 2032.
65. No. CV-LV-82-26 HEC (D. Nev. filed Jan. 15, 1982). A subsequent countercom-
plaint was filed by MGM against AMPICO, No. CV-LV-82-96 HEC (D. Nev. filed Feb. 16,
1982), and the cases were consolidated.
66. No. CV-LV-82-26 HEC (D. Nev. filed Jan. 15, 1982).
67. American Protection Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas, Inc., Nos. CV-LV-
82-26 HEC, CV-LV-82-96 HEC, slip op. at 3-4 (D. Nev. Dec. 9, 1983) (order disqualifying
counsel), affid in part & remanded in part, Nos. 83-2674, 83-2728 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 1984),
withdrawn, Nos. 83-2674, 83-2728 (9th Cir. July 11, 1985); Brief for Appellee at 6-7, American
Protection Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas, Inc., Nos. 83-2674, 83-2728 (9th Cir.
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signed as vice-president of MGM, but immediately entered into an agree-
ment to continue his old duties at an hourly pay rate and to assist
MGM's attorneys in the preparation of their case.
68
Subsequently, Morris' relationship with MGM soured. He in-
structed his attorney, Bongiovanni, to contact plaintiff's chief attorney,
Cozen, and inquire whether plaintiff would be interested in Morris' serv-
ices. 69 Cozen was extremely wary of Bongiovanni initially because he did
not know whom the outside attorney represented. 70 Wary of possible
ethical violations, Cozen warned Bongiovanni that if his client in some
way had been involved in the MGM litigation, disclosure of his identity
might make it impossible for the witness to remain in the suit.
71
Ultimately, a meeting was arranged between Cozen, Bongiovanni,
and Morris. At this meeting, Morris' identity and the existence of the
consulting agreement between Morris and MGM were revealed. Cozen
became concerned that his meeting with Morris might violate certain
canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibit ex
parte contacts with persons already represented by counsel. 72 Morris as-
sured Cozen that he was not represented by MGM's attorneys, and that,
in any event, he intended to terminate his consulting agreement with
MGM.
73
After researching the relevant law, Cozen concluded that he had an
absolute right to interview Morris to gain facts material to the litiga-
tion.74 This conclusion was premised on Cozen's belief that Morris
was not an expert within the meaning of either Rule 26(b)(4)(A) or
Dec. 3, 1984), withdrawn, Nos. 83-2674, 83-2728 (9th Cir. July 11, 1985). At this point, it
seems clear that Morris was still only a regular employee of MGM, and, therefore, discovera-
ble by deposition as to any relevant information in his possession. See Inspiration Consol.
Copper Corp. v. Lumbermen Mut. Casualty Co., 60 F.R.D. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
68. Brief for Appellee, supra note 67, at 6-7. By this time, Morris was an expert specially
retained for litigation. Information that he had acquired before being named as MGM's ex-
pert, however, remained freely discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1). See supra notes 19, 67. Con-
trary to plaintiff's assertion, plaintiff did not have a right to interview Morris on any and all
relevant matters, because Morris' position as MGM's expert shielded that information which
was developed in anticipation of litigation. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B); see also supra text
accompanying notes 56-57.
69. American Protection Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas, Inc., Nos. CV-LV-
82-26 HEC, CV-LV-82-96 HEC, slip op. at 4 (D. Nev. Dec. 9, 1983) (order disqualifying
counsel); Brief for Appellee, supra note 67, at 8.
70. Brief for Appellant at 7, American Protection Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las
Vegas, Inc., Nos. 83-2674, 83-2728 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 1984), withdrawn, Nos. 83-2674, 83-2728
(9th Cir. July 11, 1985). Apparently, Cozen was not concerned that he might inadvertently
make contact with a nontestifying expert, but rather that he was being "set up" by MGM. Id.
71. Id. at 8.
72. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(1) (1982).
73. Brief for Appellant, supra note 70, at 12.
74. American Protection Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas, Inc., Nos. CV-LV-
82-26 HEC, CV-LV-82-96 HEC, slip op. at 4-6 (D. Nev. Dec. 9, 1983) (order disqualifying
counsel); Brief for Appellant, supra note 70.
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26(b)(4)(B) because Morris had not been retained specially for litigation
until late in the process.75 Morris' consulting agreement with MGM
notwithstanding, Cozen contacted Morris on several more occasions af-
ter the first meeting.76 In these subsequent meetings, Cozen and Morris
discussed various aspects of the case, which apparently included matters
of material fact and information that Morris had prepared for trial as
MGM's expert.7
7
Once MGM discovered that these meetings had taken place, it im-
mediately moved to disqualify Cozen as plaintiff's counsel, alleging that
he had violated the provisions of the Rule and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.78 The United States District Court for Nevada disquali-
fied Cozen's firm from representing plaintiff in this action, stating in a
brief written order that "Mr. Cozen invaded the MGM/Morris confi-
dences and this was not only unfair but improper as well. . . ,. The
court recognized that Cozen firmly believed that Morris was nothing
more than a fact witness; "however, it was not for Cozen to decide
whether Morris was a 26(b)(4)(A) or 26(b)(4)(B) witness. He should
have first sought a determination by proper motion to the court. In fail-
ing to do so," the court concluded, "he acted at his own peril."80
75. American Protection Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas, Inc., Nos. CV-LV-
82-26 HEC, CV-LV-82-96 HEC, slip op. at 4-6 (D. Nev. Dec. 9, 1983) (order disqualifying
counsel); Brief for Appellant, supra note 70, at 12.
76. American Protection Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas, Inc., Nos. CV-LV-
82-26 HEC, CV-LV-82-96 HEC, slip op. at 4-6 (D. Nev. Dec. 9, 1983) (order disqualifying
counsel); Brief for Appellant, supra note 70, at 12.
77. Brief for Appellee, supra note 67, at 12.
78. Id. at 25.
79. American Protection Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas, Inc., Nos. CV-LV-
82-26 HEC, CV-LV-82-96 HEC, slip op. at 5 (D. Nev. Dec. 9, 1983) (order disqualifying
counsel).
80. Id. at 6. Once the district court's order was entered, Cozen immediately sought an
interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit, which upheld the district court's order in an opinion
issued on Dec. 4, 1984. See American Protection Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas,
Nos. 83-2674, 83-2728, slip op. at 5182 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 1984). Before the Ninth Circuit could
enter its mandate, which would have put Cozen's disqualification into effect, see FED. R. App.
P. 41(a), the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v.
Koller, 105 S. Ct. 2757 (1985). In essence, the Court held in this case that orders disqualifying
counsel in civil cases are not "collateral orders" subject to interlocutory appeal under 28
U.S.C. 1291 (1982). Koller, 105 S. Ct. at 2762-63; see also Note, supra note 2.
The Court's decision in Koller forced the Ninth Circuit to withdraw its opinion upholding
Cozen's disqualification in the MGM case because the circuit courts no longer have subject
matter jurisdiction to entertain such appeals. American Protection Insurance Co. v. MGM
Grand Hotel-Las Vegas, Inc., Nos. 83-2674, 83-2728 (9th Cir. July 11, 1985). Thus, Koller
thrust the entire Cozen matter back onto the district court. Unfortunately for Cozen, his firm
remains disqualified, and he must wait for a resolution of the entire lawsuit before gaining
another chance to appeal his disqualification. The Koller decision, as will be seen, makes the
current status of Rule 26(b)(4)(b) even more dangerous, for it is now impossible to appeal a
civil disqualification immediately. Instead, counsel must now wait until the end of the litiga-
tion before attacking their disqualification-a process that can take years.
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The court, however, did not indicate whether it would have permit-
ted Cozen to discover the identity of MGM's nontestifying experts.
Other federal courts have encountered this problem of discovery of a
nontestifying expert's identity, and have reached conflicting conclu-
sions. 8 1 This conflict stems from the ambiguity of Rule 26(b)(4)(B):
although the Rule itself does not state whether the identity of a nontesti-
fying expert is discoverable, 82 the Advisory Committee Note indicates
that the opposition can discover this information upon a proper show-
ing.83 The courts have divided into two distinct camps over the question
of what constitutes a "proper showing."
84
Conflicting Judicial Solutions
Some courts have decided that this provision requires counsel to
make the same exceptional circumstances showing that is required for
discovery of nontestifying expert information itself. These courts reason,
essentially, that there is little difference between discovery of the expert
information and his identity. Therefore, they conclude, a nontestifying
expert's identity deserves the same level of protection as his information.
Other courts, however, feel that the nontestifying expert's identity is not
as sensitive as his information. These courts recognize that knowledge of
the expert's identity may be crucial in many situations. Therefore, these
courts allow discovery of the identity when counsel can show that the
information is relevant in the lawsuit.
Exceptional Circumstances Requirement
The Tenth Circuit decided the leading case supporting the require-
ment of exceptional circumstances in Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hospital
& Training School for Nurses.8 5 In that case, the plaintiff brought a med-
ical malpractice action on behalf of his minor child, alleging that defen-
dant's carelessness was the proximate cause of his child's permanent
81. For cases allowing discovery only upon showing of exceptional circumstances, see
Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hosp. & Training School for Nurses, 622 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1980);
Weiner v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 624 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Nemetz v. Aye, 63
F.R.D. 66 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Perry v. W.S. Darley & Co., 54 F.R.D. 278 (E.D. Wis. 1971). For
cases allowing discovery of the nontestifying expert's identity upon a showing of mere rele-
vance, see Arco Pipeline Co. v. S/S Trade Star, 81 F.R.D. 416 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Baki v. B.F.
Diamond Constr. Co., 71 F.R.D. 179 (D. Md. 1976); Sea Colony, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co.,
63 F.R.D. 113 (D. Del. 1974).
82. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
83. Id. advisory committee note.
84. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 60, § 6.11 at 202-03; Graham, supra note 6, at
939; Note, supra note 51, at 360; Note, Civil Procedure-Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hospital:
Discovery of a Nontestifying Expert, 60 N.C.L. REV. 695, 700-02 (1982); Note, supra note 36,
at 544.
85. 622 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1980).
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disability.
86
After plaintiff filed suit, defendant served a set of interrogatories
that sought to discover the identities of all persons whom plaintiff had
contacted regarding the action.8 7 Plaintiff refused to provide any infor-
mation regarding his nontestifying experts on the basis that a showing of
exceptional circumstances was necessary to force such a disclosure. 88
Initially, the Tenth Circuit noted that the Rule divides experts into
four categories: experts who will be called to testify at trial, experts who
will not be called at trial, experts informally consulted, and experts
whose information was not acquired in anticipation of trial.89 The court
limited its discussion to experts of the second and third categories, how-
ever, because the identities of testifying witnesses are always discovera-
ble, and the case did not involve experts who had not been consulted in
anticipation of trial.90 Thus, the court was presented with two issues:
first, when has an expert been informally consulted; and second, what
constitutes a proper showing necessary for the discovery of the nontesti-
fying expert's identity.
The district court below held that a party informally consults with
an expert only if there is no consideration tendered for the expert's serv-
ices. 91 Other courts have held that an expert has been consulted infor-
mally when the consulting party derives no valuable assistance from the
expert.92 The Ager court, however, refused to adopt either the "consider-
ation tendered" or the "beneficial assistance" approach in favor of a
more exhaustive case by case analysis, which enables a court to consider
a variety of factors.
First, the manner in which the consultation was initiated would in-
dicate to the court whether the parties considered their relationship to be
formal or informal.93 Thus, a conversation during intermission at the
86. Id. at 498.
87. Id. The exact interrogatories were as follows:
1. Have you contacted any person or persons, whether they are going to testify
or not, in regard to the case and treatment rendered by Dr. Dan Tappen?
2. If the answer to the question immediately above is in the affirmative, please
set forth the name of said person or persons and their present residential and/or
business address.
3. If the answer to question # 1 is in the affirmative, do you have any statements
or written reports from said person or persons?
Id.
88. Id. at 498-99.
89. Id. at 500-01; see 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 2029.
90. Ager, 622 F.2d at 500.
91. Id. at 501; see Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbldg. & Drydock Co., 68
F.R.D. 397 (E.D. Va. 1975).
92. Ager, 622 F.2d at 501; see Nemetz v. Aye, 63 F.R.D. 66 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Graham,
supra note 6, at 939-40 n.182.
93. Ager, 622 F.2d at 501.
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opera with a doctor suggests an informal consultation, while an office
visit suggests a formal consultation.
Second, the nature, type, and extent of information or material pro-
vided to or by the expert in the course of his review of the case would
effect the determination. 94 The more detailed and sensitive the data that
the expert receives and the more exhaustive his analysis, the more formal
the consultation.
Third, the Ager court held that the duration and intensity of the
consultative relationship would effect the balance.95 A brief, one-time
examination might be informal, while a series of detailed tests might not.
Finally, the court found that the terms of a consultation agreement relat-
ing to payment or confidentiality of data would be strong evidence of
formality.
96
The court then turned to the second issue of what constitutes a
proper showing necessary for discovery of a nontestifying expert's iden-
tity. Recognizing that substantial contrary authority existed,97 the Ager
court found that the identity of a nontestifying witness is not discovera-
ble unless the opposition makes a showing of exceptional circumstances
mandating such discovery.
Noting that Rule 26(b)(4)(B) was developed largely around the doc-
trine of unfairness, 98 the court stated that certain policy considerations
supported its conclusion that the nontestifying expert's identity should
receive the same protection afforded his facts and opinions. First, the
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. Thus, the court held,
while we recognize that an expert witness' lack of qualifications, unattractive de-
meanor, excessive fees, or adverse opinions may result in a party's decision not to use
the expert at trial, nonetheless, there are situations where a witness is retained...
prior to the discovery of such undesirable information or characteristics. On the
other hand, a telephonic inquiry to an expert's office in which only general informa-
tion is provided may result in informal consultation, even if a fee is charged, provided
there is no follow-up consultation.
Id. at 502.
There are several advantages to this multifactor analysis. First, it allows a court to find a
formal consultation even if the expert is not paid. This discourages parties from hiding their
experts by not paying them fees. Note, supra note 51, at 357; see Sullivan v. Sturm, Ruger &
Co., 80 F.R.D. 489, 490-91 (D. Mont. 1978); Note, supra note 84, at 406; Note, supra note 36,
at 547. In addition, it allows the court to determine the expert's role according to the circum-
stances of the case and not according to an inflexible rule that can lead to illogical results. The
"beneficial assistance" test places the discovering party in an impossible position because he
must prove that he received beneficial assistance from an expert whose identity he did not
know, and without ever having seen the allegedly helpful reports. In addition, the "considera-
tion tendered" rule would ban discovery of any information obtained for free, regardless of its
importance to the lawsuit. Ager, 622 F.2d at 502; Note, supra note 51, at 357.
97. Ager, 622 F.2d at 502; see supra note 63 & accompanying text.
98. Ager, 622 F.2d at 502.
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court reasoned that the identity of the 26(b)(4)(B) expert must be pro-
tected because once it is disclosed, "the protective provisions of the rule
concerning facts known and opinions held by such experts are sub-
verted." 99 This reasoning is dubious, at best. Disclosure of the expert's
identity is not the equivalent of disclosure of the expert's information.
Opposing counsel still must show the court exceptional circumstances in
order to discover the opinions of the nontestifying expert once his iden-
tity is disclosed. Arguably, discovery of the identity makes this step eas-
ier to take, but the MGM ruling °° should serve as an adequate warning
to counsel who contemplate ex parte contacts with adverse experts.
Moreover, the nontestifying expert probably would avoid contact with
opposing counsel, because such contact might violate an exclusivity
clause in a contract with retaining counsel, might damage the expert's
professional reputation, or might violate a code of ethical conduct for
that profession.10 1 Thus, discovery of an expert's identity does not neces-
sarily endanger the information in the expert's control.
Second, the court reasoned that, by requiring a stronger showing to
discover the identity of the nontestifying expert, it would be more diffi-
cult for opposing counsel to compel him to testify.102 While this conten-
tion has merit, one must remember that a showing of exceptional
circumstances is always necessary in order to gain access to the nontesti-
fying expert's information, and that requiring the same showing to dis-
cover identity in order to protect information is redundant. 0 3 Moreover,
99. Id. at 503.
100. See supra note 79. In addition, the district courts have always had a great deal of
discretion on discovery problems. Connors, A New Look at an Old Concern-Protecting Ex-
pert Information from Discovery under the Federal Rules, 18 DUQ. L. REv. 271, 272 (1980);
Note, supra note 51, 351-52 n.15; Note, Discovery of Experts: A Historical Problem and A
Proposed FRCP Solution, 53 MiKN. L. REv. 785, 793 (1969). Part of this power arises from
the rarity with which discovery orders are reviewed, as such orders normally are not appeala-
ble. It is possible to certify the discovery order as collateral under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) (1977),
but this rarely occurs, as the courts of appeal have not shown a great interest in reviewing
discovery orders. Note, supra note 36, at 544-45. Even if the order reaches the appellate level,
the controversy often becomes moot because of a settlement. Id.
For a discussison of another example of a court's broad power in discovery matters,
Campbell Indus. v. M/V Gemini, 619 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1980), see infra note 111.
101. Graham, supra note 6, at 933; Graham, supra note 64, at 195; Note, Legal Protection
of the Confidential Nature of the Physician-Patient Relationship, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 383, 397-
98 (1952); Note, supra note 51, at 363-64; Note, Medical Practice and the Right to Privacy, 43
MINN. L. Rnv. 943, 946 (1959); Note, supra note 36, at 547.
102. Ager, 622 F.2d at 503; see Kaufmann v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1976) (Non-
testifying experts can be compelled to testify at trial at the courts discretion, regardless of Rule
26(b)(4)(B).); Graham, supra note 64, at 201.
103. Thus, in Kaufmann v. Edelstein, upon which the Ager court relied heavily, the court
found that a nontestifying expert could be compelled to testify upon a strong showing of the
following considerations: first, the degree to which the expert is called to recite facts rather
than opinions; second, if opinions are to be offered, the degree to which previously formed
opinions will be examined; third, the possibility that the expert is uniquely qualified, and that
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the adversary who succeeds in compelling the expert to testify might not
gain an unfair advantage because the expert is likely to be "client-ori-
ented" or to express contrary opinions. 104 Therefore, an independent
"exceptional circumstances" requirement to protect identity in order to
avoid disclosure of information is superfluous because counsel must al-
ready show exceptional circumstances to discover expert information.
Third, the Ager court found that, if the identity of the nontestifying
expert was was easily discoverable, the retaining party could be
prejudiced because the opposing party could introduce the name of the
absent experts at trial to create an inference that the retaining party had
attempted to hide these experts from the jury. 105 This contention com-
pletely overlooks the retaining party's ability to ask for a ruling on the
admissibility of such evidence or for a jury instruction forbidding the
consideration of this evidence during jury deliberations. 106 In light of the
court's ability to take precautions to avoid prejudice, the possibility of
injury from such use of the expert's identity does not outweigh the bene-
fits derived from the information. 107
Finally, the Ager court argued that disclosure of a nontestifying ex-
pert's identity is likely to have a "chilling effect" on the accessibility of
experts in the future because many experts do not wish to be known as
plaintiff or defendant experts.108 While the chilling effect on discovery
created by open disclosure of the nontestifying expert's identity might be
felt by a party seeking to procure experts, it could be no worse than that
already caused by the discovery of testifying witnesses allowed under
Rule 26(b)(4)(A). This provision allows not only the identity of the wit-
ness to be discovered, but his information and opinions as well. 109 Be-
cause it is not normally determined at the initial consultation whether
the expert will testify, the expert does not know in advance of discovery
or trial what he eventually will be required to disclose. In light of the
potential disclosure that the expert can be called upon to make under
Rule 26(b)(4)(A), requiring disclosure only of his identity under
no other experts with comparable knowledge can be called; and finally, the inconvenience to
the expert and others that is caused by his testimony. Kaufmann v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811,
822 (2d Cir. 1976). Thus, expert testimony will not be compelled without a strong showing of
need.
104. See Note, supra note 51, at 369; Note, supra note 36, at 551.
105. Ager, 622 F.2d at 503.
106. See C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 52 (2d ed. 1972 & Supp. 1978) (A party,
anticipating the opposition's attempt to introduce evidence of the expert's absence in order to
construe that evidence as an admission, can move to strike or for an advance ruling on the
evidence's admissability.); Note, supra note 51, at 371 n. 137.
107. For discussion of benefits deriving from the discovery of the nontestifying expert's
identity, see infra text accompanying notes 137-45.
108. Ager, 622 F.2d at 503.
109. See supra notes 52-55 & accompanying text.
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26(b)(4)(B) would not seem capable of deterring any more experts than
already occurs.
Moreover, the exceptional circumstances requirement in Ager could
hinder a party's ability to determine which experts had or had not been
retained by the opposition. This would be especially problematic in fields
with only a few experts. 110 If opposing counsel could not discover the
identity of the nontestifying expert, she literally would be blindfolded in
a minefield, for an innocent encounter with any of the retained experts
might lead to the attorney's disqualification or other sanctions."'
Just as the unfairness doctrine could not prevent the ultimate recog-
nition of liberal expert discovery in general, it should not be 'construed to
mandate a showing of exceptional circumstances before a nontestifying
expert's identity can be discovered. A court certainly must be aware of
potential unfairness to the retaining party, particularly when discovery of
110. Note, supra note 51, at 371.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 65-80. This is especially true when the adverse
expert is dissatisfied with his current employer, and decides to "jump ship" as in the MGM
case. IaL Moreover, the adverse counsel could seek to disqualify the opposition counsel by
collusively arranging for a 26(b)(4)(B) witness to contact the opposition without disclosing his
identity.
In a case similar to MGM, the Ninth Circuit has demonstrated its willingness to fashion
broad remedies to punish violations of the Rule. The case of Campbell Indus. v. M/V Gemini,
619 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1980), involved a lawsuit between the manufacturer of a ship (Campbell)
and its owner (Gemini), regarding the vessel's alleged unseaworthiness. During the course of
the litigation, Campbell retained an expert and named him as a testifying trial expert under
Rule 26(b)(4)(A). Approximately one month before trial, Gemini moved to take the opposing
expert's deposition, as is allowed upon the proper showing under Rule 16(b)(4)(A)(ii). The
affidavit that Gemini submitted with its motion, however, revealed that Gemini had had ex
parte contacts with the opposing expert on several occasions. It was at these meetings, appar-
ently, that the expert had revealed information damaging to his employer's case and had ex-
pressed a willingness to testify on behalf of Gemini. The district court denied the motion for
deposition, and as a sanction for Gemini's "flagrant violation" of the Rule, ordered that Camp-
bell's erstwhile expert be precluded from giving any testimony at trial. Id at 26.
The Ninth Circuit upheld the disqualification of the trial expert. "A district court," it
noted, "is vested with broad discretion to make discovery and evidentiary rulings conducive to
the conduct of a fair and orderly trial." Id. at 27. This discretion includes the power to
exclude the testimony of experts altogether, and to exclude the testimony of witnesses whose
use at trial is in bad faith or would cause unfair prejudice. Id. The court concluded that the
district court was well within its discretion in prohibiting the testimony of the expert, which
thereby denied Gemini the fruits of its misconduct. Id
Gemini, although not dealing specifically with nontestifying experts or identity discovery,
is an example of courts' intolerance of discovery abuses. Although the record in this case is
unclear on the point, it seems possible that Gemini's initial contacts with Campbell's expert
could have been entirely innocent, in that Gemini may have neglected to ascertain through
discovery what testifying experts Campbell had retained. In this sense, Gemini would have
been in the same position as a party confronted with his opponent's nontestifying experts,
because it would not have been readily apparent whether an expert had been contacted or
hired by the opposition already. Thus, in Gemini, as in MGM, it possibly was counsel's igno-
rance of the opposition's "team roster" and of the penalties for invading those confidences that
brought about the severe sanctions from the court.
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the expert's identity alone could alert the opposition to a secret trial
strategy. Cases such as these, however, will be rare, and a court can
always issue a protective order if necessary.11 2
Furthermore, the benefits to be derived from discovery of the non-
testifying expert's identity clearly outweigh any potential unfairness.
First, discovery of this information will advance trial preparation, in that
knowledge of the expert's identity is necessary to determine whether an
expert report exists.1 13 Second, discovery of the nontestifying expert's
identity will help prevent the kind of unfairness experienced by plaintiff
and plaintiff's counsel in MGM.1 1 4 On balance, requiring counsel to
show exceptional circumstances for discovery of the nontestifying ex-
pert's identity, when so many benefits derive from that discovery, is
unwarranted.
The Ager court's conclusion rests in part on its failure to under-
stand fully the relationship of Rule 26(b)(4) with Rule 26(b)(1). 115 In the
Ager court's view, section 26(b)(4)(B) is not subject to 26(b)(1)'s general
relevance requirement because it has its own exceptional circumstances
requirement. Thus, the court reasoned that the Advisory Committee's
requirement of a proper showing for discovery of the expert's identity
must relate back to the stricter showing of exceptional circumstances and
not to 26(b)(1)'s mere relevance requirement.
1 16
General Relevance Requirement
Other courts, however, have approached the problem from a dif-
ferent perspective than Ager and have found Rule 26(b)(1)'s relevance
requirement to control all of Rule 26(b) cases except when express provi-
sions state otherwise.1 1 7 For example, in Baki v. B.F. Diamond Con-
struction Co., 18 a Jones Act1 19 admiralty case, the plaintiff sought to
112. Courts have broad discretion under Rule 26(c) to issue protective orders, and also
have considerable authority to enforce those orders under Rule 37. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 6, § 2281, at 753-54.
113. Sea Colony, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 63 F.R.D. 113, 114 (D. Del. 1974); Graham,
supra note 6, at 937.
114. See supra notes 78-80.
115. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides:
(b) Scope of Discovery. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance
with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privi-
leged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . .
including the. . . identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discover-
able matter . ...
FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1).
116. Ager, 622 F.2d at 503; see FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4)(B) advisory committee note.
117. See supra note 63.
1-18. 71 F.R.D. 179 (D. Md. 1976).
119. 46 U.S.C. 688 (1979).
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compel answers to his interrogatories requesting the identities of defend-
ant's 26(b)(4)(B) experts. The defendant refused to answer, relying on a
predecessor of Ager,120 which also had required exceptional circum-
stances for such discovery.
12 1
The Baki court, however, found that the exceptional circumstances
requirement did not extend to the discovery of the nontestifying expert's
identity:
Rule 26(b)(1) requires that the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of any discoverable matter be supplied. . . .Such a broad
umbrella encompasses the category of experts, who have been retained
or specially employed in anticipation of litigation or preparation for
trial and who are not expected to be called as witnesses at trial [i.e., a
26(b)(4)(B) expert], since they may have knowledge of matter discover-
able or potentially discoverable under the provisions and requirements
of Rule 26(b)(4)(B).
122
The court reasoned that section 26(b)(4)(B) does not specifically mention
the discoverability of the identity of the nontestifying expert because the
authority to discover the expert's identity is already given in section
26(b)(1). 123 Thus, Bak held that, in order to discover the nontestifying
expert's identity, only the general relevance requirement of Rule 26(b)(1)
must be satisfied.'
24
The Bak court's approach also receives support from at least one
commentator. 25 Although this commentator did not mention Bak spe-
cifically, he criticized the Ager court for failing to consider the overriding
policy favoring full trial preparation. In light of this fundamental policy,
the author concluded, "it seems more appropriate that courts allow dis-
covery of retained experts' identities under rule 26(b)(4)(B) whenever rel-
evant to the litigation .... ,1126 Allowing discovery of expert identity
upon a showing of mere relevance to the litigation is precisely the ap-
proach taken in Baki. 27
Baki would thus seem to have solved the problem created by the
ambiguity of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) regarding discovery of a nontestifying ex-
pert's identity. Counsel, seeking to discover this information, will argue
with great force that the nontestifying expert's identity is relevant, espe-
cially in light of the MGM case.128 Because the showing of relevance
could be made with comparative ease, counsel should easily be able to
discover the identity of the nontestifying expert.
120. Perry v. W.S. Darley & Co., 54 F.R.D. 278 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
121. Id. at 280.
122. Id. at 181-82.
123. Id. at 182.
124. Id
125. See Note, supra note 51, at 372.
126. Id. (emphasis added).
127. See supra text accompanying note 124.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 65-80.
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Baki, however, is a sufficient response to the ambiguities of Rule
26(b)(4)(B) only when counsel is already aware of the possibility of harm
posed by nontestifying experts. When counsel, as in the MGM case, 129 is
unaware that the opposition has engaged experts or that an apparent fact
witness has been designated as an expert, the possibility of harm to both
counsel and client looms large.'
30
Thus, neither of the two current interpretations of the Advisory
Committee's Note's proper showing requirement is acceptable. As the
discussion of the Ager case made clear, requiring exceptional circum-
stances for the discovery of expert identity is not necessary to protect the
expert's information because counsel must already meet the high stan-
dard to gain discovery of information. Placing the exceptional require-
ment on discovery of identity, when such information can be crucial,
seems unwarranted. The Baki analysis, although not as egregiously
flawed as Ager, still requires an affirmative act by counsel in order to
discover nontestifying expert identity. As seen above, this is unaccept-
129. See supra text accompanying notes 65-80.
130. A recent study has indicated that in 72% of the cases in which experts were em-
ployed, opposing counsel sought to discover all or some of the nontestifying experts. See Gra-
ham, supra note 64, at 193. With such a large majority of cases involving discovery of
nontestifying experts, the scenario played out in the MGM case seems certain to occur with
greater frequency. Even if the possibility of unauthorized ex parte contact is remote, the
amendment proposed by this Note is justified because the injury incurred in only one of these
types of cases is staggering. In the MGM case, for example, the main litigation involved a
dispute over allegedly fraudulent insurance claims of some $40 million. With the possibility of
punitive damages taken into account, Cozen's firm could have earned millions of dollars if it
had not been disqualified. The harm to the plaintiff has been equally severe. In addition to
losing its counsel of choice, AMPICO has spent tens of thousands of dollars in pursuing the
disqualification issue through the appellate system. The delay fostered by the disqualification
has also been enormous. Although the fire giving rise to the cause of action took place in 1981,
at the time of this writing, the parties have yet to complete discovery on substantive issues, or
to set the case for trial.
Equally disturbing is the fact that in some districts, courts allow discovery of the nontesti-
fying expert without the required showing of exceptional circumstances. A local rule of the
Western District of Pennsylvania directs a party to file with the court a statement including the
names and addresses of all experts and physicians consulted in connection with the case, and
to authorize all other parties to interview these experts, examine his pertinent records, and to
obtain reports in connection with the case. W.D. PA. R. 5 II C(2)(c); see also Graham, supra
note 64, at 193 n.52. While the Pennsylvanian local rule does require automatic disclosure of
the nontestifying expert's identity, which would be required by the proposed amendment, it
also forces disclosure of the nontestifying expert's information without any showing of excep-
tional circumstances. Moreover, from the language of the local rule, the information of any
expert contacted in connection with the case, regardless of the formality of the contact, must
be disclosed. This "shotgun" approach to expert discovery must be avoided because of the
delicate nature of the information involved and of the employer-employee relationship. The
proposed amendment is superior to the Pennsylvanian approach, in that it requires only the
disclosure of the nontestifying expert's identity in order to prevent prejudice. Any further
discovery of the nontestifying expert is conditioned upon the proper showing of exceptional
circumstances.
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able, in that counsel might not be aware that nontestifying experts exist
in a given case and might innocently contact them, or the unscrupulous
expert may contact unsuspecting counsel in an attempt to sell his infor-
mation to the highest bidder.
Proposed Solution
If the 1970 amendment that created Rule 26(b)(4)(B) had reflected a
greater concern for judicial scrutiny of expert discovery, the problems
stemming from identity discovery could have been avoided. In order to
foster a more efficient and fair system of discovery, articles by Mr. Long
and Professor Friedenthal, which have had profound influence on the
development of current attitudes toward expert discovery, 131 offer several
suggestions. These general objectives provide a good framework within
which to suggest certain modifications to expert discovery.
According to Long, the key to fairness in discovery was reciprocity.
When the parties are in a similar position with respect to each other's
experts, discovery should be encouraged; when they were not, discovery
should be conditioned or limited so that parties obtain advantages
equally. 132 Long's approach would have required the parties to deter-
mine in advance whether they were going to engage experts for the litiga-
tion, and, if so, to complete their examinations far enough in advance of
discovery to allow the court to peruse the written reports of the experts.
Upon reading the experts' reports, the court would be able to determine
if discovery of an expert was likely to cause prejudice, and accordingly
order depositions or exchanges of reports as necessary to maintain
reciprocity.133
For Friedenthal, timing of discovery was paramount. 34 Therefore,
absent a showing of good cause to limit discovery, Friedenthal would
have allowed discovery of testifying experts a short time before trial after
it was clear which experts would testify and which would not. 135 By
requiring parties to list their experts in advance, the court would be able
to prevent opposing parties from hiding potential fact witnesses, and
would also prevent parties from attaining evidence from nontestifying
experts. 136 Although neither writer set forth a specific set of proposals
regarding expert discovery, nor foresaw the exact dimensions of the
problem posed by discovery of the 26(b)(4)(B) witness, 137 the gist of their
131. Graham, supra note 6, at 900, 905.
132. Long, supra note 7, at 153; see also Graham, supra note 6, at 905.
133. Long, supra note 7, at 153.
134. Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 487.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Both Long and Friedenthal wrote some nine years before the 1970 Amendment was
adopted.
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general proposals suggests a more reciprocal, timely, and automatic ex-
pert discovery than the Rule provides today.
In order to alleviate the problems described above, the following
amendment to the Rule, which has its roots in the writings of Long and
Friedenthal, should be adopted:
26(b)(4)(D). Timing of expert discovery. Before discovery is to com-
mence, the court shall require both parties to set forth in writing the
identities of all experts they have contacted in anticipation of litigation
or in preparation for trial, regardless of whether these experts are to
testify at trial or not, and shall require parties to update that informa-
tion as necessary. After the exchange of this information, the parties
may then, pursuant to section (b)(4)(A)(i) of this Rule, send interroga-
tories to those experts who qualify, and may petition the court for fur-
ther discovery under section (b)(4)(A)(ii). Contact by opposing
counsel with an expert qualifying under section (b)(4)(B) of this rule
without the court's approval is expressly prohibited, and is cause for
sanctions under Rule 37.138
The effects of the proposed amendment would be threefold. First, by
expressly prohibiting unauthorized contact with nontestifying experts,
the parties who retain them should not be fearful of exposing the identi-
ties of the experts that they have retained. Similarly, opposition counsel
will be deterred from surreptitiously seeking to contact these experts
once their identities are disclosed, for fear of the extremely heavy penalty
to be paid for such an infraction. The proposed rule thus codifies the
holding in the MGM case, 139 in that it explicitly states that any ex parte
contact with the nontestifying expert without court authorization could
result in disqualification.
Third, by forcing each side to prepare a "team roster," the litigation
as a whole will benefit from better trial preparation and smoother discov-
ery. Forced disclosure of the nontestifying expert's identity will allow
the opposition to determine more easily whether nontestifying experts
have been retained in the first place, and whether they have rendered any
reports that are germane to the suit. Without this information, it is im-
possible for opposing counsel to make the necessary showing of excep-
tional circumstances to discover these experts and their reports, as a
party cannot discover what it does not know exists. In this sense, the
proposed amendment fills an obvious gap in the original rule, which al-
lowed discovery of nontestifying experts without creating a mechanism
for a party to learn whether such experts had actually been retained.
In addition, the proposed amendment provides a uniform rule to be
followed by all circuits, as opposed to allowing the various circuits either
to adopt or reject the proposed amendment. The courts that have ad-
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (providing sanctions for failure to make or cooperate in dis-
covery).
139. See supra notes 65-80 & accompanying text.
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dressed the issue are in substantial disagreement over the topic of identity
discovery, as evidenced by the Ager1'4 and Baki 41 decisions. The addi-
tion of this rule would add much needed uniformity in an area where
prejudice to retaining and opposing parties has proven great.
Most importantly, however, the amendment would enable all parties
to be certain that their attempts to consult experts would not harm their
own case, because both sides would know whom they could and could
not contact. As the Rule now stands, parties operate at their own peril in
seeking experts for assistance in preparing a suit. If an attorney contacts
an expert who has been previously retained by the opposition, there is an
inherent danger that the expert will either reveal confidential information
to the attorney inadvertently or that the unscrupulous expert will play
both sides of the litigation against each other in order to secure the best
possible deal for himself. Furthermore, opposing counsel who makes ex
parte communications with an expert will be disqualified, even if coun-
sel's motive was innocent. 142 Thus, the current Rule leaves unanswered
vital questions regarding counsel's ability to contact experts.
It might be argued that this proposed amendment contravenes the
general policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
leaves the discovery process primarily up to the parties involved in the
lawsuit.143 This policy notwithstanding, the Rules always have recog-
nized that expert discovery is one area in which the guiding hand of the
court is necessary to avoid prejudice. The Rules set forth in detail when
and how a testifying 144 or nontestifying expert may be discovered.1 45 Ex-
pert discovery has thus proven to be one area in which the Rules have
allowed courts extraordinary powers over the normally autonomous dis-
covery process.
The problem with discovery of the nontestifying expert's identity is
caused by ambiguity within the Rule itself.146 By clearing up this ambi-
guity, questions regarding the interpretation of the "proper showing" re-
quirement would be conclusively resolved, and parties would know
exactly what to expect from a situation in which identity discovery was
at issue.
Conclusion
If adopted, the proposed amendment to the Rule would remove the
uncertainty presently surrounding discovery of a nontestifying expert's
140. See supra notes 85-116 & accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 118-30 & accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 65-80 & accompanying text.
143. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a).
144. See id. Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i), (ii); see also supra text accompanying notes 51-57.
145. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B); see also supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
146. See supra notes 62-64 & accompanying text.
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identity by establishing firm guidelines for all courts to follow. All par-
ties to litigation would benefit from this amendment because it would
enable them to avoid the risk of disqualification and, by the same token,
to rest assured that the opposition would not approach their experts. As
any football fan knows, it is impossible to tell the players without a pro-
gram. The proposed amendment would allow the litigation's players and
observers to know exactly who plays for whom.
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